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ALD-220        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4628 
___________ 
 
RAYMOND EDWARD CHESTNUT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN J. THOMAS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-01403) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 1, 2014 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: May 13, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Raymond Chestnut appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because the appeal fails to present a 
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substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6.   
 Chestnut, a federal prisoner, is currently serving a sentence imposed by the United 
States District Court for the District of South Carolina for convictions of conspiracy to 
distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(A), and the possession, use, or carrying of a firearm in connection with a drug 
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  Chestnut withdrew his direct 
appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  As the District Court noted in detail, 
Chestnut has since repeatedly sought to attack his conviction, including filing three 
motions to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and three applications to the 
Fourth Circuit to file a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3), 
2255(h), each of which was denied.  
Chestnut filed the instant § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction in which he is confined, challenging his 
convictions on the grounds that he is actually innocent because there was insufficient 
evidence to support his guilty plea.  The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction, and this appeal ensued. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
findings of fact.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).   
Generally, the execution or carrying out of an initially valid confinement is the 
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purview of a § 2241 proceeding, as attacks on the validity of a conviction or sentence 
must be asserted under § 2255.  See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213-14 
(1952).  Chestnut clearly seeks to attack the validity of his sentence, not its execution.  
Chestnut may not pursue a collateral attack on his sentence by way of § 2241 unless he 
can show that “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of his detention.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  It is clear that, under this “safety valve” 
provision, a prior unsuccessful § 2255 motion or the inability to meet the statute’s 
stringent gatekeeping requirements does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective.  See 
In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).  Rather, the exception is narrow, 
limited to extraordinary circumstances such as where the petitioner “had no earlier 
opportunity” to present his claims and has been convicted for conduct which is no longer 
deemed criminal.  Id.   
This is clearly not a situation in which Chestnut “had no earlier opportunity to 
challenge his conviction.”  Id.  Chestnut reasons that he should be allowed to seek relief 
under § 2241 “saving[s] clause” because the Supreme Court “made a substantial change 
of law” in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), rendering his conduct non-
criminal.  In Bailey, the Court held that § 924(c)(1)’s ban on the “use” of a firearm did 
not reach “mere possession” of a weapon.  Id. at 143.  Bailey was decided before 
Chestnut was convicted, however, and he therefore had the opportunity to present these 
claims either on direct appeal or in a motion to vacate; the fact that his initial § 2255 
motion was dismissed as untimely does not render that remedy ineffective.  See Cradle v. 
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United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
at 251-52) (§ 2255’s savings clause “exists to ensure that petitioners have a fair 
opportunity to seek collateral relief, not to enable them to evade procedural 
requirements”).   
 Accordingly, because no “substantial question” is presented as to the dismissal of 
the § 2241 petition, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.   
 
